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1. Introduction
  Analysis of demand for health care for disease-specific 
services has a number of advantages. First, diseases vary 
widely in severity and medical interventions are not equally 
effective for all types of diseases and medical conditions. 
Considering all the diseases together can make demand 
analysis misleading due the aggregation of many different 
types. Second, a number of tropical diseases have their 
own peculiarities that require specific interventions for the 
control or elimination of the disease making these virtually 
independent medical commodities. Third, some of the 
diseases like kala azar (KA), is a disease of the poor[1,2] and 
treatment seeking behaviour of the poor and vulnerable 
people may differ significantly from others[3,4].
  A number of research studies have been conducted to 
understand demand for medical care services in developing 
countries[5-12]. Despite, the interest in empirical demand 
analysis, econometric methodologies and findings have 
differed widely. Most analyses tend to simplify the 
demand analysis by assuming homogeneous “medical 
care services”. Prices used in demand functions are often 
inadequate and do not represent the “prices” consumer’s 
face. For example, some studies used standard fee schedule, 
some used expenditures per medical visit and few used 
hedonic prices[6-8,10-12].  Policy implications related to price 
and cost cannot be derived unless the empirical model use 
appropriate price measures. In addition to the price effects, 
other factors affecting demand for medical care are also 
crucial for designing effective health policy for developing 
countries. Although many of the tropical diseases are 
endemic in south Asia, disease specific demand analyses 
using regional data are still quite rare.
  The paper is based on information collected in KA 
endemic areas of Nepal to explore the factors affecting 
utilization of KA services as well as differential effects 
of prices on demand for services by poor and non-poor 
households. This study has estimated a multinomial logit 
model to identify factors affecting consumer choice of 
alternative health care providers, namely public hospital, 
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public clinics, private providers, drug stores and self care. 
Beyond the usual variables like prices of health care, 
income, knowledge and information, we also investigate a 
set of individual and household characteristics that may 
provide important insights into the potential opportunities 
and challenges of KA control policy.
2. Methods and materials
2.1. The utility structure and the empirical model
  The behavioural model in this paper has been developed by 
adapting the models purposed in a number studies analyzing 
healthcare demand[7,8,10,11,13,14]. The utility function is 
derived as a function of health and consumption. In event of 
an illness, a KA patient decides the type of medical care she 
will consume. For deriving the theoretical underpinnings 
of the analysis, we can start from a general utility function 
u, which depends on health status (H) and consumption of 
goods (C) for the individual i.  Therefore, in absence of any 
illness (say KA), the utility function can be written as
  ui=u(Hi, Ci)   (1)
With KA, utility function shifts downward and therefore,
  ui=a
j
ku (Hij, Cij)   (2)
  Where, {ak
j} value of ak when jth type of care is used, 0<ak
j
曑1 and the value of it depends upon the severity of illness. 
After successful treatment of KA, value of ak will become 
equal to 1.0 so that the utility function shifts back to the 
original level. Note that the choice of providers affect utility 
in two different ways: first, by shifting the utility function as 
the severity of the disease declines and second, by affecting 
health status and consumption. It is assumed that the utility 
function satisfies strict convexity condition.
  Uc>0, Ucc<0, UH>0, UHH<0
  Therefore, health status of a consumer with KA depends 
on the type of treatment services (M) received as well as 
individual and provider related characteristics (X).
  Hi=H (M1, M2…Mj, Xi)   (3)
  The health production function exhibits Hm>0, Hmm<0.
The consumer receives income from total working time 
multiplied by wage rate and other sources like unearned 
income and transfer payments. Thus total income of the 
consumer can be expressed as:
  Yi=毮Ai+氊Ti (4)
Where, 毮is flow of income from other sources such as 
assets or home production (A) of an individual consumer, 
氊 is the wage rate, T is total working time for an individual 
consumer. The consumer allocates her total budget for 
health care and consumption of goods and services. 
Therefore, monetary value of consumption of non health care 
goods and services can be written as:
  Cij=Yi-Pij     (5)
Where, Cij is the monetary value of resources that consumer 
spends on a composite commodity which includes all goods 
and services excluding health care received from provider 
type j. Pij is the value of resources that individual consumer 
devotes to receive the medical care from health provider j. 
The equations (3) and (5) suggest that consumption of non 
health care goods and services, the attributes of the health 
care provider choices and the characteristics of the decision 
maker enter the utility function shown in equation (2). Since 
we are modelling discrete choice of types of healthcare 
providers, the utility function should be expressed as 
random utility for empirical estimation. By definition, 
random utility has two components: deterministic component 
V and a random component 毰. The random utility function 
can be written as:
  Uij=Vij+毰ij  (6)
  The individual consumer selects the health care provider 
j that maximizes her utility. In empirical estimation, 
assumptions on the distribution of the disturbances lead to 
various estimable discrete choice models like probit and 
logit. The random utility model can further be simplified 
by assuming additive separability of utility arguments. 
Therefore, the utility function (3) and (5) can be written as,
  Uij=ak
j{f(Yi-Pij)+H(Mij, Xi)}+毰ij     (7)
In this formulation, utility is a function of net income (Yi-Pij) 
after paying for health care provider j and health production 
function H(Mij, Xi) that depends upon attributes of health 
care provider choices and decision makers. Presence of 毩
in the equation should not pose a problem as 毩 is affected 
by provider attributes, which are already included to explain 
the health status H.
  For empirical specification, following Sahn[10], we can 
assume that the health production function H(Mij, Xi) is 
linear in M and X. The set of X includes individual and 
household characteristics. The variable Mij are related to 
quality of medical care as perceived by consumers. Although 
the standard care for KA is available only in public hospitals 
in Nepal, we cannot assume that the characteristics of other 
types of health care providers will not affect the health status 
of KA patients[8,10]. Use of non-standard care types may help 
KA patients in reducing pain and suffering, or help in the 
diagnosis of the disease. Thus, the provider characteristics 
may reflect some aspects of quality but, in general, quality 
of services is treated as unobserved, similar to a number of 
previous studies[7,10,13].
  For specifying the empirical equation, we again follow 
a number of previous studies to define the function f(.) in 
equation (7) as an additive function of log of net consumption 
and square of log of net consumption (function of prices 
and income in quadratic form). The quadratic functional 
form allows the possibility that higher-income consumers 
may choose high price-high quality options compared to 
relatively low-income consumers. Therefore, in quadratic 
form, we can write:
 f(Yi-Pij)=毬1{1n(Yi-Pij)}+毬2[1n(Yi-Pij)]
2.
  For discrete choice problems, consumers compare the 
expected utility of any option j with the utility derived 
from “reference” option so that the difference in utility 
values between the two options (Vj-Vo) helps the consumer 
to select the best option. For price and income variables 
(ignoring 毩 in the equation), difference between two options 




Note that this type of discrete choice demand function may 
be estimated by using Multinomial Logit (MNL) or Nested 
logit Model (NLM). The MNL model is relatively robust[15,16] 
and in this analysis we have used the MNL model for our 
empirical estimation.
2.2. Sample size and data collection
  This study uses cross sectional data collected from KA 
patients in Nepal. Both qualitative and quantitative methods 
were used to collect data from patients and their household 
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members. The purpose of mixing the qualitative and 
quantitative study design is to produce a better picture of KA 
situation in endemic regions of the country and to generate 
information for developing and designing of the survey 
questionnaires. The qualitative methods were also used to 
better understand the decision making steps and processes 
KA patients follow in selecting the healthcare option from 
various options available in the community.
  The quantitative data were collected using a structured 
questionnaire which included questions on various 
factors affecting demand by care and choice of providers. 
The questionnaire asked patients about the origin and 
progression of illness, visits to providers, cost of care, 
transportation cost, opportunity cost, knowledge about 
KA and KA treatment, income of the household, whether 
borrowed money to pay for healthcare costs, various 
socio-demographic characteristics of the patient and the 
household. To ensure quality of data collected, rigorous 
mechanism were in place at all stages of the survey and data 
collection. Questionnaires were designed in a way so that all 
the questions are in a logical order, easy to understand and 
phrased in local language.
  Data on self reported incidence of illness and health status 
are subject to significant errors in reporting or systematic 
bias[17-20]. Health care costs are also often reported with 
relatively high recall bias[2,21]. To minimize these problems, 
we have decided to collect data from all KA patients showing 
up in the district hospitals. In Nepal, more than 80% of KA 
patients seek care from district hospitals at some point of 
the disease stage. Therefore, collecting information from 
hospital based patients will have relatively low selection 
bias, if any. The advantage of this type of survey is that 
there is no uncertainty or recall bias about the disease; only 
the patients who tested positive for KA in the hospital were 
interviewed.
  For this study, data were collected from clinically 
confirmed KA patients seeking care from six hospitals 
located in five high prevalence KA districts of Nepal. 
Consumers who sought care for any reason from outpatient 
facilities of the hospitals during the period October 2008 
to December 2008 constituted the sampling frame for the 
study. When a KA case was clinically confirmed, the field 
researchers contacted the patient immediately to start 
collecting data on the disease, its progression, and the 
history of healthcare service use. During the three months of 
data collection, the study successfully collected information 
from 367 KA subjects out of 379 KA cases seeking care 
from these six hospitals. Note that the survey collected 
information from more than 25 percent of all KA cases in the 
country for the year 2007-2008 (1 371 cases were reported for 
2007/2008)[22].
  The ethical clearance for this study was obtained from 
WHO/TDR, Geneva and Nepal Health Research Council, 
Kathmandu, Nepal. The researcher began interview with a 
general introduction and greeting process to build rapport 
and promote a relaxed and informal atmosphere. Then 
researcher read thoroughly consent form and consent 
certificate and requested to the participants provide consent 
for survey, if they agreed, survey procedure had proceed, if 




  For the empirical analysis, all KA service providers are 
categorized into five provider-types to define the dependent 
variable of the demand model. The choices or options are: 
self-care, drug store, public clinic, private clinic/hospitals 
and public hospitals. Actions taken by individuals or family 
members in response to illnesses are considered “self 
care”. Self-care includes various types of home-based care, 
use of homemade traditional medicine, consultation with 
traditional healers, getting traditional medicines from the 
market, etc. Public clinic providers in Nepal are the sub-
health posts, health posts and primary health care centers. 
Private providers include clinic service providers, private 
hospitals and nursing homes. Drug store is also an important 
source of care. Patients often obtain drugs directly from the 
drug store at the recommendation of the store personnel. 
Public hospital providers are the district and zonal hospitals.
  Individual characteristics, such as age, sex, health status, 
belief system and health needs affect demand for healthcare 
services. It is usually assumed that there exists a u-shaped 
relationship between health care use and age[6]. Perceived 
need of health services (health status) is a subjective 
evaluation of individual’s physical symptoms or health 
status. If the patients feel that the need for healthcare is 
high, they are more likely to seek care from outside sources. 
Similarly, likelihood of obtaining care from healthcare 
providers will be higher if the self-reported health status 
is categorized as “severe”. Perceptions of the respondent 
about their risk of contracting KA and attitude or beliefs 
related to modern health care services are defined as binary 
or categorical variables.
  In developing countries, estimating the prices of healthcare 
services is often quite problematic. Transportation and 
other related costs, in many cases, far exceed the actual 
out-of-pocket fee charged by health facilities. In most of 
the previous studies, prices of medical care were estimated 
using very narrow definition of cost. Unlike the previous 
studies, we have collected detailed information on cost 
components so that full price of medical care options can 
be derived. Therefore, price of health care have been 
calculated by including costs of medical care services, 
drugs, transportation, travel time, waiting time, unofficial 
charges such as tips and bribes, etc. Most of these cost items 
are available in monetary terms but travel time and waiting 
time require conversion of time into money values. In most 
cases, two alternative approaches can be used for valuing 
time of individuals[23,24]. In this analysis, we have used 
opportunity cost method to estimate the monetary value of 
time[22,25]. The opportunity cost of time is defined by market 
wage rate, or in absence of wage information, minimum wage 
rate set by the government can be used as a proxy.
  Knowledge about health and disease is an important factor 
affecting the decision making of consumers[26]. Poorly 
informed consumers may underestimate the marginal benefit 
of prevention and treatment.  Individuals receive health 
information from various sources such as radio, television, 
poster, etc. on symptoms of disease, disease vectors, 
preventive and curative measures. Since health information 
is of various types, the degree of health knowledge of an 
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individual can be measured by obtaining data on signs and 
symptoms of disease, sources of information on the disease, 
service availability, mode of transmission, preventive 
approaches, etc.  For constructing the knowledge index, we 
have assigned one point for each of the correct responses 
and negative one point for each wrong answer. Sum of all 
the points define the knowledge index. Individuals who 
answered all the questions correctly receive a score of 
38 and who provided all incorrect answers receive -38. 
Therefore, the knowledge index ranges from +38 to -38.
  Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables 
included in the empirical model. Note that self care was 
the choice of about one-fourth of all KA patients in the 
sample, followed by drug store as the first contact healthcare 
provider. Only 16 percent patients sought care from the 
public hospitals as the first contact provider. It is interesting 
that more than 80% of households reported borrowing money 
for the treatment of KA, although the KA care is provided 
free of charge at public hospitals. In our sample, about 50% 
of patients are from disadvantaged ethnic groups. Almost 60 
percent patients reported that the reason for the choice of 
service provider was the quality of services rendered. Only 
34 percent of the patients had favorable or positive attitude 
towards modern public facilities, particularly hospital care. 
More than 50 percent reported that they were aware of their 
relatively high risk of contracting the disease.
3.2. Maximum likelihood estimation
  The results of the multinomial logistic model are reported 
in Table 2. The estimated coefficients suggest that prices 
incurred for accessing healthcare and household income 
significantly affect the decision making on the choice of 
providers.  The higher is the price associated with obtaining 
care from a provider-type, the less likely are the patients to 
seek care from the type compared to self care. The patients 
from higher income households are more likely to utilize any 
type of health care facilities compared to self care. Patients 
who have better knowledge about KA and its prognosis are 
more likely to utilize public hospitals. The positive attitude 
of patients towards modern western care in the treatment of 
KA (compared to the base category that modern western care 
is not effective) increases the probability of using public 
hospitals. The household with higher family size is less 
likely to utilize the public hospital.
  Education does not seem to be associated with the use 
of public hospitals and clinics. People living with poor 
health status are more likely to use public facilities than 
the individuals who report their health status as moderate. 
Disadvantaged population groups are less likely to use 
public hospital, although the coefficient is marginally 
significant. The empirical estimation indicates that patients 
who need loans for the treatment of KA are less likely to 
visit public health services, although the KA services are 
provided free. Clearly, cost of accessing services from 
public hospitals is relatively high due to relatively high 
distance from KA patient residences. Perceived good quality 
of provider-type also affects the likelihood of seeking 
care from the type. The belief system is also an important 
determinant of obtaining care from public hospitals.
  The statistical tests related to model fitting and diagnostics 
are quite encouraging. Pseudo R2 is found to be high and 
Hausman test has confirmed that there is no significant IIA 
problem in the model. Most of the estimated coefficients 
are statistically significant and are of expected signs. Wald 
test, a diagnostic test for identifying the influence of omitted 
variables, indicates that omitted variable bias may not be an 
important concern for the model.
3.3. Elasticity
  From the regression coefficients reported in Table 2, 
elasticity values can be estimated at the mean or at the 
median values of the independent variables. Since median 
would be a better reflection of changes expected due to 
changes in price and income, median values were used 
to calculate the elasticities. Table 3 reports the estimates 
of own price and income elasticity of demand derived 
from the coefficients estimated for the choice model. The 
results indicate that services of public hospitals and private 
providers are highly price elastic. A one percent increase in 
the full price of public hospital or private provider services 
reduces the use of the provider-types by about 8%. Income 
effect is also quite high and almost similar for both public 
and private health care services. If income is increased 
by one percent, demand for public hospital medical care 
is expected to increase by about 9% on the average. The 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in demand analysis (n=367).
Variables Category Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Log of consumption (price) Continuous 0.02 0.03   0.00* 0.16
Log cons. square (income) Continuous 0.43 0.50   0.00* 2.84
Disadvantaged groups Dummy 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Household size Continuous 6.58 2.42 2.00         20.00
Age of consumer Continuous          23.68          16.51 2.00         80.00
Square of age Continuous        832.52     1 026.65 4.00    6 400.00
Male Dummy 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Highest educational level Continuous 3.76 3.84 0.00         15.00
Knowledge index Continuous 9.17 12.03        -20.00         36.00
Borrowed money Dummy 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00
Quality service as reason Dummy 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Health status severe Dummy 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Positive attitude (belief) Dummy 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Perceived risk of KA Dummy 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
*Numbers became very close to zero after logarithmic transformation. Source: Survey of kala azar patients in the district hospitals.
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elasticity numbers are quite unexpected for public clinic 
services. Utilization of public clinics decline with the 
increase in income and the price effect for the public clinic 
services is also found to be positive. It appears that public 
clinics in Nepal are considered inferior by KA patients. 
Similarly, price elasticity is positive for drug store while the 
income elasticity is negative. For both these sources of care, 
public clinic and drug store, the negative income effect is so 
large that the price effect becomes positive.
3.4. Policy simulations
  Using the results reported above, we can conduct a number 
of policy simulations. In this section, we analyze two short 
term policy instruments to encourage the use of public 
facilities for KA patients. These two policy options are: a) 
introduction of demand side financing; and b) improving 
knowledge about KA. The demand side financing (DSF) 
mechanism provides money to patients to encourage 
utilization of desired medical care services. The introduction 
of DSF for KA care is logical because the use of the standard 
care provided through the public hospitals appear to be 
highly price elastic. In recent years, Government of Nepal 
is planning to implement demand side financing for KA 
care services. Another variable found to be important in our 
empirical analysis is the knowledge index for KA patients or 
their family members. We use these two policy instruments 
to simulate the ceteris paribus effect of these policies on the 
use of public hospitals for the treatment of KA.
3.4.1. Demand side financing
  DSF or direct cash payment to the KA patients for accessing 
services from public hospitals can help improve the 
choice of appropriate kind of medical intervention. How 
successful a DSF program would be will depend on the 
type of incentives adopted, i.e., whether the DSF increases 
the income of households or reduces the full price of the 
desirable medical care options or both. Given that the price 
elasticity of public hospital use is very high, subsidizing 
the travel cost plus reimbursement for the time spent in 
travelling and waiting will increase the utilization of public 
hospitals at a relatively high rate. Note that the demand side 
financing will improve the utilization of public hospitals not 
only through the price effect but also through the income 
and borrowing effects.
  For simulation purpose, we introduce five levels of cash 
transfer to those who seek care from public hospitals. The 
levels of cash transfers are: 200 Nepalese Rupees (NRs), 
500 NRs, 700 NRs, 1 000 NRs, and 1 500 NRs. Therefore, 
demand for healthcare services will be affected through the 
changes in the price faced by patients at district hospitals 
and increase in income due to cash transfers. Reduction in 
the price of public hospital services will shift some patients 
away from self care to hospital care at the margin. As long 
as the cash transfer is less than the full price, changes in 
demand will be influenced by the price effects. If the cash 
transfer is greater than the full price, the excess cash will 
increase income of households and will create an additional 
income effect.
  The results suggest that even with relatively high levels of 
cash transfer, utilization of public hospitals is unlikely to 
exceed the 63 percent level. In fact, 63% rate of utilization 
is achieved at the cash transfer level of 700 NRs. This 
implies that the DSF should be able to attract almost all KA 
patients willing to visit district hospitals for KA treatment 
by providing 700 NRs per case. Higher cash transfer will 
have relatively small impact on public hospital utilization 
rate. Note that utilization will continuously increase through 
income effects but the effect of income on utilization rate 
is relatively small. The predicted probabilities due to the 
introduction of DSF are given in Table 4.
3.4.2. Knowledge on KA
  To simulate the changes in knowledge index, average 
knowledge index was set at the levels 20, 25, 30, and 35. As 
mentioned earlier, the highest value of knowldege index has 
Table 2
Factors affecting choice of provider type by KA patients in Nepal-Results of the multinomial logit model.
Variables
Coefficienfs(Std. Err.)
Drug stores Private providers Public clinics Public hospitals
Log consumption -10 001.38(2 227.31)* -10 638.31(2 230.36)* -9 714.54(2 225.28)* -10 640.41(2 236.65)*
Log consumption square 583.76(126.751 1)* 621.76(126.926 4)* 567.24(126.632 6)* 620.74(127.278 8)*
Disadvantaged group -0.12(0.776 7) -1.06(0.855 1) -0.51(0.775 4) -1.80(1.112 8)***
Household size -0.02(0.197 3) 0.11(0.208 8) 0.10(0.196 4) -0.59(0.272 9)**
Age -0.12(0.076 4)*** -0.11(0.086 1) -0.07(0.081 2) -0.17(0.099 4)***
Age square 0.00(0.001 1)** 0.00(0.001 3) 0.00(0.001 2) 0.00(0.001 5)
Male -0.36(0.782 2) -0.25(0.848 0) -0.44(0.775 8) -0.24(1.015 9)
Highest education -0.05(0.118 7) -0.06(0.127 1) -0.09(0.118 1) 0.00(0.143 5)
Index of knowledge about KA 0.05(0.037 6) 0.05(0.040 2) 0.08(0.037 3)** 0.16(0.049 8)*
Borrowed money -19.70(2.848 3)* -19.43(2.941 2)* -19.30(2.917 8)* -24.91(2.771 0)*
Quality as the reason for choice -0.31(0.775 2) 1.54(0.867 6) 0.57(0.767 2) 3.18(1.178 2)*
Severe health status 0.40(0.840 8) 1.62(0.915 7) 0.14(0.841 5) 0.97(1.075 6)
Positive attitude towards modern care 1.52(0.909 1)*** 1.34(0.977 0) 1.72(0.896 2)*** 2.74(1.108 7)*
Risk of KA -0.27(0.931 6) 0.89(1.001 4) 0.49(0.936 1) 1.35(1.181 0)
Constant 14.87(2.071 0)* 9.20(2.176 4)* 13.17*(2.184 7) 14.81(dropped)
LR (56) 691.69 Number of iterations=19
Prob. > 氈
2     0.00 Hausman test of IIA
Pseudo R2     0.59 氈
2(8) = 50.87
Log likelihood                                   -241.48 Prob>氈
2 = 0.00
*Significant at 1% level, **significant at 5 % level ***significant at 10 % level. (Reference category=self or home care). 
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patients belonged to poor households (households below 
the official poverty line). Most of the KA patients live in 
rural areas but the recommended treatment is available 
only in urban district hospitals, creating significant access 
problems for the KA patients in Nepal. To estimate a model 
to explain the choice of healthcare providers, we have used 
the standard MNL regression with five alternative options. 
One of the potential problems of using multinomial logistic 
model is the assumption of IIA and Hausman test indicates 
that there is no significant IIA problem in the model.
  The regression results indicate that prices of healthcare 
options, income of households, knowledge of KA, borrowing 
money for treatment, caste and other minority status, age of 
the person, perceived quality of services provided, trust in 
public hospitals, etc. affect the demand for health care. The 
coefficients of all the variables considered in the model are 
of expected signs. Our result is consistent with other studies 
that improved knowledge about the disease increases 
the utilization of desired type of health care facilities. 
Lack of information often leads to wrong decisions, which 
may adversely affect health outcomes and wellbeing of 
consumers.
  Socio-demographic variables like age and gender of 
patients, household size, education, belief system, etc., 
affect the choice of healthcare types but the directions of 
the effects cannot be defined by apriori considerations. 
The directions of the effects depend upon the nature of the 
study, illness being considered, severity of symptoms and 
probability of survival. In our study, there was no effect of 
education on health care utilization. The reason for this 
unexpected result could be because of the low educational 
attainments of KA patients in general. Most of the KA 
patients and their family members are either illiterate or 
have less than five years of education.
  In developing countries, borrowing money to finance health 
expenses is very common[2,27]. Lack of financial resources 
directly influences utilization of healthcare services. We find 
that borrowing money for the treatment of KA significantly 
lowers the likelihood of seeking care from public hospitals. 
In many empirical studies, information on borrowing for 
paying healthcare expenses is not considered and therefore, 
in many cases, empirical studies underestimate the total 
cost of healthcare services. Most studies concentrate on the 
impact of user fees on utilization but taking out a loan to 
pay for medical care services adds additional expenses with 
the user fees and has longer term impacts on economic and 
been defined as 36. In the multinomial choice regression 
model, knowldege index was important in the choice of all 
the healthcare alternatives. Therefore, changes in knowledge 
index will affect utilization of all types of medical care 
services. Table 5 reports the predicted probability of choice 
of providers due to improvement in the knolwdege index 
from 20 points to 35 points.
  The results in Table 5 imply that improvement in 
knowledge index reduces the likely of using self-care 
or home care. Use of drug stores and private clinics also 
decline with better knowledge, although the effect is very 
small. Better knowledge about the disease and its treatment 
does improve the utilization of public hospitals. Therefore, 
strengthening the health education program related to KA 
should have significant impact on the utilization of most 
desirable source of KA treatment, the public hospitals. 
4. Discussion
  In this paper, we have used a demand framework widely 
used in the literature to analyze the demand for health care 
by KA patients. In general, the KA patients are relatively 
poor in the community and in our sample 90% of the KA 
Table 3
Own price elasticity of demand and income elasticity.
Variables Public hospital Public clinic Private provider Drug Store
Price -8.04*   3.88* -8.01*     6.37*
Income   9.25* -4.56*   9.51* -16.11*
*1% level of significant.
Table 4
Effect of cash transfer on probability of utilizing public hospital.
Price and income effects of transfers
Assumed cash transfer levels under demand side financing (NRs)
200 500 700 1 000 1 500
Baseline (0.16) Price effect 0.20 0.35 0.63 0.63 0.63
Income effect 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.28
Table 5
Effects of knowledge about KA on the choice of health care providers.
Value of the knowledge index
Healthcare options available to KA patients
Self care Drugstore Private provider Public  clinic Public hospital 
Baseline probability of seeking care from    0.23     0.22    0.20 0.19 0.16
Elasticity with respect to knowledge index  -0.55  -0.11  -0.08 0.15 0.94
Information 20 points    0.14    0.20    0.19 0.22 0.32
Information 25 points    0.12    0.20    0.18 0.22 0.35
Information 30 points    0.11    0.20    0.18 0.22 0.37
Information 35 points    0.10    0.19    0.18 0.23 0.39
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social wellbeing of the household[2,27].
  Most of the households in our sample are extremely 
poor and poor individuals are likely to be more price 
sensitive[3,24]. We find that the absolute values of price and 
income elasticity are relatively large. Given that we have 
considered five alternatives in the model, we expected 
relatively high elasticity numbers. However, the elasticity 
numbers are very high, probably because of the very low 
income levels of the households in the sample as well as 
our use of full price as the measure of medical care costs. 
Full price is calculated by adding the various cost items 
like cost of medical care and drugs, transportation cost and 
opportunity cost of time. A number of studies[5-9] have used 
official price of services ignoring other cost items and in one 
case (Sahn et al[10] ), the researchers have used opportunity 
cost of time only for approximate the cost of seeking medical 
care. Therefore, our study has used more realistic measure 
of cost or price. Official prices of many health services are 
almost zero in many developing countries of the world but 
households spend quite significant amount of resources for 
receiving the services. In many cases, informal payment is 
high in many public facilities.
  Due to high price elasticity of KA care and high spillover 
effects of KA on the society, policy makers may consider 
demand side financing (DSF) as an instrument to encourage 
utilization of public hospitals. We analyzed introduction 
of DSF with different levels of monetary incentives. The 
results suggest that it is difficult to change the behaviour 
of people who consult drug store or other lower-level 
facilities through the incentive mechanism created by DSF. 
The incentives will significantly lower the use of self care 
and increase the utilization of public hospitals. Similarly, 
we have used knowledge index as another policy variable. 
In a poor developing country, knowledge about the illness 
can be improved significantly through health education 
interventions. If knowledge indices can be improved, the 
use of public hospitals will also increase significantly.
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